Recently, the Maloney Firm’s Greg Smith secured a significant victory for our client Andy Cruz, the Olympic gold medal-winning boxer and undefeated lightweight contender. Judge Orrick of the Northern District of California ruled a 2023 promotional agreement between Cruz and New Champion promotions was invalid and unenforceable. Cruz is now able to continue advancing his career under the sole direction of Matchroom Boxing, his current promoter, without interference from New Champion Promotions.

The Facts

After winning a gold medal at the Tokyo Olympics, Cruz left Cuba and engaged New Champion Promotions to help connect him to a major boxing promoter that could showcase his talents on the biggest stage possible. 

Jesse Rodriguez, the president of New Champion Promotions, connected Cruz with Matchroom Boxing and the parties signed an agreement that designated New Champion as Cruz’ co-promoter with Matchroom and required Matchroom to pay Cru a lucrative signing bonus and fight purses.  However, because Cruz did not have a U.S. Visa and bank account, the contract called for Matchroom to initially pay Cruz’ money to New Champion, which would then distribute the funds.   Problems arose when New Champions Promotions began withholding portions of Cruz’s winnings, claiming it was entitled to 25 percent of all payments under an alleged oral agreement that was not reflected in the documents.

Greg Smith secured the win for Cruz by demonstrating critical facts. First, that no valid oral contract existed between Cruz and new Champion Promotions because the alleged agreement did not specify essential terms and lacked proper consideration. These oversights mean any alleged oral agreement, if it occurred, was legally invalid. The Court ruled that what was agreed upon between Cruz and New Champion Promotions was that Rodriguez would serve as a go-between to find a major promoter, not that Rodriguez was engaged to be that promoter himself. Furthermore, New Champion Promotions had only promoted one fight in its history, which had operated at a loss, which makes it unlikely Cruz would have thought of New Champion Promotions as a promoter.

The court recognized that enforcing New Champion Promotion’s interpretation of the agreement would have been exploitative dive into Cruz’ pockets without any legitimate contractual basis.

The Victory

The Maloney Firm protected Cruz from New Champion Promotions’ theft of his hard-earned purses.

The court’s ruling dismissed NCP’s claims to percentage-based compensation, confirming that Cruz owes nothing to NCP as a promoter. The case once again underscores the importance of clear contractual terms and the need to protect athletes from overreaching business partners.

For athletes, entertainers, and other professionals entering complex business relationships, this case underscores the critical importance of experienced legal counsel who can identify problematic terms, protect your interests, and take decisive action when disputes arise.

Attorneys are submitting briefs to courts containing fabricated case citations, fabricated quotations, and entirely invented legal authorities. These are not just careless mistakes or isolated incidents. They are the predictable result of delegating critical legal work to artificial intelligence systems that their vendors claim are reliable but demonstrably are not.

In Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P., 2025 WL 2374381 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2025), the California Court of Appeal confronted a recent example of this in which counsel submitted an opening brief in which 21 of 23 legal quotations were entirely fabricated. The attorney had used generative AI tools to draft the briefs, then used additional AI tools to verify the citations—a practice equivalent to fact-checking rumors by asking about other rumors. He never consulted the cases themselves. The court’s response was surgical: a $10,000 sanction, a referral to the State Bar of California, and notification to the client.

But the damage extends far beyond one attorney’s misconduct.

What Are AI Hallucinations?

When generative AI systems encounter a request they cannot answer from their training data, they are less likely to say they don’t know the answer. Instead, they will make one up. These made-up sources tend to appear entirely authentic (complete with case names, citations, court designations, etc.). The systems do this out a desire to be helpful to the user (uncertainty is very unhelpful!).

Large Language Models (AI systems) are pattern-matching systems. They are not capable of reasoning. Instead, they take input data, compare it to patterns in the data they already have in their system, and produce a guess at the correct answer. Sometimes their guesses are really good, but they do not understand law, logic, or arguments. In fact, they cannot think like a lawyer. They cannot think at all.

Still, vendors (often recent undergraduates or college dropouts) market these tools as reliable legal research platforms. They explicitly claim the tools are “hallucination-free” and these claims are easily disproven. Research has shown disturbingly high levels of hallucinations across all of the readily available AI legal research tools, including both the more general tools (e.g., Chat-GPT or Claude) and the specialized ones marketed to lawyers specifically (e.g., Lexis Nexis and Thomson Reuters). The marketing is incorrect.

The Scope of the Legal Hallucination Trend

A comprehensive study of 114 federal court cases involving AI hallucinations in attorney filings reveals a troubling pattern. Small law firms account for the vast majority of incidents, but this is likely only because larger firms have more resources to catch errors (i.e., multiple attorneys reviewing each document before submission). The legal profession is experiencing economic strain across the board, and it’s likely that AI tools will grow in popularity as more and more firms struggle to manage large workloads and growing price sensitivity. AI tools offer the illusion of sophistication and efficiency while delivering a new way of making the same mistakes.

A Profession-Wide Problem Requiring a Profession-Wide Response

The American Bar Association issued formal guidance on AI use in July 2024. State bars have begun developing continuing legal education requirements. Yet incidents continue at an accelerating pace. Dozens of new cases have been added to hallucination databases since the ABA’s guidance was published.

Individual attorney vigilance is necessary but often insufficient. The legal profession must treat AI hallucinations as a systemic threat requiring coordinated action: mandatory, rigorous CLE on AI risks; clear ethical guidelines prohibiting delegation of citation verification to machines; bar association monitoring of AI tool performance; and heightened scrutiny of filings incorporating AI research.

But the most essential rule remains unchanged and cannot be automated. Read your briefs. Check your citations against primary sources. Verify everything yourself. Understand that the tools you are relying on are fundamentally less reliable than their marketing claims suggest.

AI can assist with legal work. Verification, however, cannot be delegated to machines. The profession must treat that distinction as non-negotiable, or it will continue paying the price in sanctions, bar discipline, and lost public confidence.

Attorneys looking to transition their career into private mediation or arbitration will still need to maintain their active State Bar licenses, according to a recent ruling by the California Court of Appeal. Getzels v. State Bar of California, 2025 No. B338089 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 4, June 26, 2025) reinforces California’s regulatory approach to keeping attorney-arbitrators and mediators under the full scope of State Bar oversight. The unanimous three-judge appellate panel’s decision settles significant constitutional questions while establishing clear boundaries for attorneys seeking flexible arrangements that combine retirement with specialized practice in private dispute resolution. The case makes it clear that inactive attorneys cannot serve as private dispute resolution professionals.

The case creates another problem. Inactive attorneys in good standing with the State Bar are prohibited from serving as private dispute resolution professionals unless they make their license active.  Non-attorneys, however, including disbarred attorneys, attorneys who resigned under discipline, and unbarred law school graduates can not only practice as neutrals.

The Facts

The underlying case concerns Morris S. Getzels, a 72-year-old attorney who retired from traditional legal practice in 2022 but wanted to continue his 25-year career in arbitration and mediation. Getzels hoped to transfer to inactive status to avoid the higher licensing fees (currently $515 annually for active members versus reduced fees for inactive status) and mandatory continuing legal education requirements while maintaining his ADR work.

California State Bar Rule 2.30 prevented this arrangement. The rule prohibits inactive licensees from “occupying a position wherein he or she is called upon in any capacity to give legal advice or counsel or examine the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act, document or law.” This language effectively requires attorneys working as private arbitrators and mediators to maintain active licensure.

Getzels mounted a comprehensive constitutional challenge to Rule 2.30, raising two primary arguments that the Court of Appeal ultimately rejected: 1) a strict scrutiny argument, and 2) a rational basis challenge. Getzels first argued that Rule 2.30 violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the federal and California Constitutions by treating inactive licensees differently from “everyone else in the entire world.” He claimed the rule impinged on a fundamental liberty interest in “freedom of contract,” specifically the “freedom of contract liberty rights of disputants and litigants to choose whomever they want to arbitrate or mediate their disputes.” The appellate court firmly rejected this argument, relying on established Supreme Court precedent, particularly West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937), which held that “freedom of contract” is not a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, the court applied rational basis review rather than the strict scrutiny standard Getzels sought.

Getzels alternatively argued that even under rational basis review, Rule 2.30 lacked any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. The court disagreed, finding multiple rational justifications for the rule’s distinctions. The State Bar has a legitimate interest in maintaining a competent bar and ensuring professional conduct of all licensees who engage in law-related activities. The court also found it rational for the State Bar to conclude that inactive licensees working as arbitrators and mediators would burden the regulatory system because the State Bar would still receive complaints about their conduct and be required to investigate and respond to them, despite these attorneys only paying reduced fees.

The court also found that there was a rational basis for Rule 2.30’s disparate treatment of inactive attorney licensees and non-licensed neutrals, reasoning that non-licensed arbitrators and mediators fall outside the State Bar’s jurisdiction entirely and therefore do not place a burden on its regulatory system. The rule’s structure reflects the State Bar’s position that attorneys serving as private arbitrators and mediators remain closely connected to legal practice, generate ongoing regulatory oversight demands, and should therefore contribute to the full cost of that oversight.

Key Takeaways

Attorneys who wish to serve as private arbitrators or mediators must maintain active State Bar membership even after retiring from the practice of law. This means payment of annual active licensing fees, completion of mandatory continuing legal education requirements, and full regulatory oversight and disciplinary jurisdiction. The “inactive” status option with the State Bar is not available for private dispute resolution work.

When advising clients on dispute resolution clauses, attorneys should consider whether requiring active attorney-arbitrators provides additional oversight benefits worth potential cost increases. Parties will need to be more cognizant of the status of the mediator they choose: non-licensed mediators and arbitrators cannot be disciplined or regulated through the State Bar of California. Similarly, parties must determine if the mediators and arbitrators they consider were ever attorneys and if so, if their licenses are maintained.

For now, the Getzels case means inactive attorney cannot practice as an arbitrator, but a disbarred attorney, or an attorney who resigned from the bar, or a J.D. who never passed the bar, can. In the short term, there is likely to be some confusion among consumers of private dispute resolution when choosing their private dispute resolution professionals. For now, consumers are left to navigate a system where professional qualifications and regulatory oversight do not necessarily reflect who can actually serve as a private mediator or arbitrator.

Even experienced trial courts can err when calculating attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeal’s reversal in Tidrick v. FCA US LLC, 2025 WL 1234567 (Cal. Ct. App. [4th Dist., Div. 3]) underscores that proper attorney fee calculations protect the integrity of fee-shifting statutes and the rights of prevailing parties to recover reasonable compensation. Moreover, fee motions should be treated with the same rigor as merits briefing.

Tidrick v. FCA US LLC involves a claim made under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act for vehicle defects, its settlement and a request for attorney’s fees. The original attorney fees and costs calculation of $82,719.33 used reasonable rates for attorneys in Orange County, where the case was filed and decided (and where FCA US, a subsidiary of an international company, is headquartered). However, the trial court awarded only $15,000 total (without specifying how much was for fees and how much was for costs), representing an 82.9% fee reduction. The Court of Appeal went on to reverse this award entirely, citing several errors in the trial court’s analysis, including:

1. Venue, Not Plaintiff’s Residence, Determines Applicable Attorney Rates

The trial court chose to apply attorney’s fees based upon the going rates in Fresno County, where the automobile was purchased and where plaintiff resides. The rates in Fresno County are much lower than the requested rates, but the case was filed, heard, and decided in Orange County. Additionally, defendant FCA maintains its principal place of business within the United States in Orange County. When multiple venue options exist, plaintiffs may choose where they file their cases. The Court of Appeal emphasized that the “reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” The meaning: where the court is located, not where the plaintiff resides. Given this, attorney’s venue strategy should be crafted around the impact on potential fee awards and not just convenience.

2. Courts Must Apply Lodestar Method with Precision

The trial court’s recalculation was sloppy and imprecise. The court failed to specify how many of the claimed 173 hours were “reasonably incurred” or what hourly rate applied to allowable hours. Instead, the court awarded a lump sum representing a dramatic decrease in the award and absent any explanation for how the award was calculated. Courts must follow the lodestar method in calculating their fees and fee reductions (i.e., reasonably expended hours x reasonable hourly rate). Not only did the court fail to demonstrate the method through which the fee reduction was calculated, the court also presented a lump sum for fees and costs without specifying how funds were allocated. To compound this error, defendant FCA never challenged the $8,444.33 cost request in the first place. Costs and attorney fees are distinct and require separate analysis.

Attorneys moving for a reduction in the amount of fees awarded should present a clear calculation, including documentation of actual hours with detailed billing records, an inventory of prevailing rates with market surveys and comparable awards, and a request for specific findings on both components. Leaving a recalculation up to the trial court might end in erroneous fee awards. Similarly, if the opposing party does not object to the cost award, a note of this waiver should be made in the reply.

3. Lack of Justification for a Substantial Fee Reduction

The trial court criticized the underlying case as being “simple” and suggested it should have been “resolved quickly,” without any case-specific analysis of which claimed attorney’s fees were unreasonable or an explanation for why they were unreasonable. At 82.9% reduction in attorney’s fees is enough to meet the “shock the conscience” standard set by Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5^th 246. The Court of Appeal stated, “when a trial court applies a substantial negative multiplier to a presumptively accurate lodestar attorney fee amount, the court must clearly explain its case-specific reasons for the percentage reduction.” Therefore, when opposing fee motions, attorneys must provide detailed, hour-by-hour analysis of the allegedly excessive time. Submitting a general criticism of the amount of fees awarded is not enough without examples of inefficiencies or unnecessary work.

4. Improper Use of Procedural Missteps to Justify Fee Reduction

The Court of Appeal ruled the parties’ failure to provide a copy of their confidential settlement agreement did not justify a reduction in attorney’s fees. Courts cannot penalize parties for procedural issues unrelated to the reasonableness of fees incurred. Settlement confidentiality is legitimate and cannot justify fee reductions. Should a court request documents that cannot be provided due to privilege or confidentiality, the limitation should be formally addressed, and an offer of alternative supportive evidence for the fee request can be offered.

This decision reminds us that attorney fee motions should be treated with care. Proper application of the lodestar method for fee award calculation is crucial, and when seeking or opposing fee awards, success depends upon careful attention to legal standards, factual documentation, and strategic presentation. The Tidrick reversal demonstrates that even experienced trial courts can err when attorney fees are at stake. By understanding these key principles and avoiding the pitfalls identified by the Court of Appeal, practitioners can better serve their clients and ensure that fee awards are determined through proper legal analysis rather than rough approximation.

A recent California Court of Appeal decision potentially undermines the motion reservation systems of local courts. In CFP BDA, LLC v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. July 10, 2025) the Fourth Appellate District ruled that local court rules for timely filing after motion reservation cannot prevent a timely filed summary judgment motion from being heard, even when those local rules about filing deadlines have been violated.

California’s larger counties struggle with calendar management. To prevent judges from being overwhelmed with too many motions on one day or having empty calendars on others, most major counties implemented online reservation systems. Litigants must reserve a hearing date first, then file their motion within a specified timeframe, typically three to ten days after reservation. Litigants who miss that deadline lose their hearing date. This system was designed to prevent parties from reserving multiple dates without an intention to use them. Though the system has problems, it has successfully provided structure to court calendars.

Unfortunately, the system has also resulted in parties not being able to get the dates they want and sometimes facing delays of months before hearing dates are available. This results in motions being heard far later than appropriate, resulting in delays.

The Underlying Case and The Court of Appeal’s Ruling

A lawsuit involving Bermuda Dunes Airport involved adjacent landowners seeking to impose an easement on airport property. On November 14, 2024, the defendant reserved an April 1, 2025, hearing date for their motion for summary judgment. Under Riverside County’s local rules, they had ten days to file the underlying motion to preserve that date. The defendant did not file by the November 24 deadline to meet Riverside’s rules, and instead waited until January 10, 2025, to file their motion for summary judgment. This timing satisfied the requirement of Code of Civil Procedure Section 437(c) (81 days’ notice before the hearing and the hearing occurring 30 days before trial). However, it violated the (local) ten-day rule by about two months. As a result, the court cancelled the hearing date and rejected the filing. The trial court also denied all requests to specially set the motion for hearing, leaving the defendant without an opportunity to present their summary judgment motion before trial.

Then the Court of Appeal got involved. The court’s opinion makes clear that, while local rules should be obeyed, the statutory requirements trump local rules when it comes to summary judgment motions. Since the defendant’s motion complied with 437(c), the trial court was obligated to hear it, regardless of the local court’s rule violation.

The decision establishes that when a summary judgment motion meets statutory deadlines, courts cannot refuse to hear it based solely on local rule violations. Administrative convenience cannot prevent consideration of timely filed motions on their merits. Furthermore, when local rules conflict with statutory rights, trial courts must find ways to accommodate both, whether through trial continuances or expedited hearing schedules.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the difficulty trial courts face in managing unwieldy calendars and explicitly stated the decision should not be construed as challenging the validity of local reservation rules. However, the court’s reasoning clearly creates tension with those provisions by establishing that statutory compliance alone creates an obligation for courts to hear summary judgment motions.

What You Should Know

The decision carries immediate strategic implications that extend beyond summary judgment motions. If statutory compliance trumps local rules for motions under CCP Section 437c, similar logic could apply to other motions filed on regular notice. The underlying statutory language for regular motions is virtually identical to that governing summary judgment motions, suggesting the Court of Appeal’s reasoning could render local reservation rules essentially meaningless across all motion practice.

While the Court of Appeal’s decision may provide a safety net for missed local deadlines, it’s not a license to ignore reservation requirements. Courts retain discretion in how they accommodate conflicting demands, and sanctions remain a risk for attorneys who flagrantly disregard local rules.

Attorneys should pay careful attention to the impact the CFP BDA, LLC v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. July 10, 2025) decision has on local court calendars, as well as any reflexive changes to local rules. Rules requiring prompt filing of motions were intended to dissuade attorneys from preemptively booking hearing dates they might not use. However, the process of advance booking arose out of necessity when attorneys discovered that, without reserving dates for motion for summary judgment hearings well ahead of time, they risked not being able to secure a hearing date or not being able to secure a date that complied with the deadlines before trial. Until a solution to the underlying problem is found (chronic underfunding of California’s court system and an insufficient number of judges to handle the state’s litigation demands), local rules are not likely to be successful in managing the scarcity through administrative controls, and lawyers may need to continue to create ad hoc solutions. The problem requires a legislative solution that addresses judicial resources, rather than piecemeal fixes that create conflicts between the procedural requirements of different authorities.

A recent California Court of Appeal decision has deepened a split among state appellate courts regarding how trial courts must justify substantial percentage reductions to attorney fee awards. The May 2025 ruling in Michael Cash v. County of Los Angeles, _Cal. App. 5th ___ (2025) [WL 1540542; Case No. B336980], underscores issues that may impact business litigation cases in which attorney’s fees are recoverable. 

The dispute centers on what level of scrutiny appellate courts should apply when reviewing a trial court’s decision to impose an “across-the-board” percentage reduction to attorney fees. This issue affects a variety of business litigation cases (e.g., employment disputes, consumer protection cases, and civil rights claims) where prevailing parties are entitled to recover attorney fees. While some courts continue to apply the “abuse of discretion” standard (i.e., requiring only that the trial courts articulate a general justification for fee reductions), others have adopted “heightened scrutiny” (i.e., demanding the trial courts provide specific, case-by-case explanations for their chosen percentage reduction. 

The Cash Decision: Affirming Traditional Deference 

In Cash, the trial court reduced the plaintiff’s attorney fee request from $735,310 to $455,546, which was a 30% across-the-board cut. The court justified this substantial reduction based on findings of “unreasonable padding,” “duplicative” work, and unnecessary prolonging of trial proceedings. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the reduction of the trial court. In their opinion, they explicitly rejected the heightened scrutiny approach adopted by courts in cases like Warren v. Kia Motors America 30 Cal. App. 4^th 37 (2018) and Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations 96 Cal. App. 5^th 908 (2023). The majority held that importing federal civil rights law standards into California fee determinations was inappropriate and inconsistent with the state’s longstanding policy of deferring to experienced trial judges. Justice Baker’s partial dissent argued that when courts apply “meat cleaver” reductions rather than precise line-item cuts, they should provide more detailed justifications to enable meaningful appellate review. The dissent criticized the trial court’s minimal explanation for the 30% reduction, noting that the court’s primary concrete example (inefficient trial questioning) could account for only about 15 hours of unnecessary time, hardly justifying a reduction equivalent to over 400 hours of work. The Cash court noted that this split in authority makes the case “a good candidate for a grant of Supreme Court review.” Until the California Supreme Court provides guidance, practitioners must navigate this uncertain landscape carefully. 

What You Need to Know 

The Cash decision suggests a handful of best practices for litigants. Parties seeking fees should continue to document everything and present comprehensive and thorough fee applications. With courts potentially applying broad percentage cuts, meticulous time records and detailed billing descriptions are critical. Be prepared to justify every hour billed, especially when multiple attorneys work on similar tasks. For litigants opposing fee requests, focus on patterns to identify systematic issues such as duplicative work or excessive hours for routine tasks. Referring to percentage reductions approved in similar cases can support your proposed reductions. The larger the fee reduction requested, the more compelling and detailed your justification will likely need to be. 

Other Considerations for Fee Applications 

• Real-Time Documentation: Record not just time spent but the necessity and results of each task 

• Regular Case Assessment: Periodically evaluate whether case staffing and strategies remain cost-effective 

• Strategic Presentation: Organize fee requests to highlight efficiency and necessity rather than just hours worked 

As this area of law continues to evolve, staying informed about developments in different appellate districts will be crucial for effectively advocating for clients’ interests in fee-shifting litigation. 

In Escamilla v. Vannucci 2025 Cal. LEXIS 439 (Cal. Mar. 20, 2025), the California Supreme Court weighed in on the question of how long non-clients have to sue attorneys for professional misconduct (e.g., malicious prosecution). This decision has implications for businesses who have been targeted by frivolous lawsuits, as well as attorneys who might find themselves on the receiving end of a claim from a previous case.

In the underlying case, Daniel Escamilla, working as a fugitive recovery agent, searched the home of Lan Ting Wu and Andy Yu Feng Yang, looking for Yang’s brother, who was wanted on felony drug trafficking charges.

Yang and Wu sued Escamilla for assault, battery, trespass, false imprisonment, and emotional distress. They hired an attorney (Vannucci) to represent them in the case in which Escamilla claimed the search was supported by probable cause and cross-complained for abuse of process. The jury found in favor of Escamilla and was awarded $20,000 in damages.

Additionally, Escamilla filed a malicious prosecution action against Yang, Wu, and their attorney, John Vannucci. Vannucci moved to strike Escamilla’s complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), and the trial court granted Vannucci’s motion, agreeing that the one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.6) applied. The California Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.

The Supreme Court’s Intervention

The California Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations for claims arising from a lawyer’s professional services also applied to a claim for malicious prosecution. The key statute under discussion, Section 340.6, reads:

An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.

The crux of the matter was whether the one-year statute applied when a non-client sued a lawyer for alleged professional misconduct, such as malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the statute was ambiguous in this specific context and because of this ambiguity, the court considered legislative history, policy, and purpose in rendering its opinion. Although some justices argued the text of the statute was clear and should be followed according to its letter, the court ultimately held that the two-year statute applies in malicious prosecution lawsuits brought by a non-client.

Key Takeaways

This ruling has implications for businesses who have been targeted by malicious prosecution. If your business has faced frivolous litigation or questionable legal tactics from opposing counsel, this ruling provides additional time to consider your options. However, it’s still advisable to consult with your legal team promptly to preserve evidence and evaluate potential claims.

The Escamilla decision reflects the court’s commitment to fairness in the legal system, ensuring businesses and other non-clients have reasonable time to pursue legitimate claims against attorneys who may have abused the litigation process.

Congratulations to Maloney Firm attorneys Patrick Maloney and Greg Smith for being recognized as 2025 Southern California Super Lawyers ® in Business Litigation.

Super Lawyers recognizes top attorneys in Southern California each year. The selection process involves peer nomination, independent research, and peer evaluations. This recognition covers various legal fields and emphasizes distinguished professionals in the region.

Effective January 1, 2025, amendments to the California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) § 664.6 aim to enhance the settlement enforcement process and clarify the court’s authority in civil disputes. These changes are expected to encourage settlements, ensure compliance with agreed terms, and improve procedural efficiency. Attorneys must familiarize themselves with these updates to effectively navigate the litigation process and safeguard their clients’ interests.

One of the key changes to CCP 664.6 is the court’s ability to dismiss a case without prejudice while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement until all terms are fulfilled. In the past, the request for the court to retain jurisdiction needed to be done explicitly, either through filing a stipulation and proposed order with a copy of the settlement agreement and request for the trial court retain jurisdiction under Section 664.6, or the filing of a stipulation and proposed order signed by the parties noting the settlement and asking that the trial court retain jurisdiction under Section 664.6. This process meant that some parties failed to formally ask for the trial court to retain jurisdiction beyond agreeing to this inside of the settlement agreement itself.

The new Request for Dismissal form includes a checkbox that allows the parties to request the court to retain jurisdiction over the settlement under Section 664.6. This eliminates the need for parties to formally request that the court retain jurisdiction, ensures that settlements can be enforced, and reduces the paperwork needed to be filed with the court.

Another significant amendment concerns the validity of signatories for the new Request for Dismissal form. The updated Request for Dismissal Form (CIV-110) includes a checkbox to request the trial court to retain jurisdiction. When the parties request that the court retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, the matter must be dismissed without prejudice. When a matter is dismissed with prejudice, the court loses jurisdiction.

 The form itself can be signed by the party, their attorney, or an authorized agent of an insurer (with written authorization). However, attorneys must exercise caution: signing agreements of any kind without explicit authorization may result in professional discipline unless good cause can be demonstrated.

Additionally, the amendments address filing fees and post-judgment motions. Parties who have already paid a first appearance fee will not be charged again for filings related to the settlement after judgment or dismissal. This adjustment reduces financial burdens and simplifies post-settlement procedures, making the process more accessible and efficient for all parties involved.

In summary, the amendments to CCP 664.6 are designed to make settlement agreements more enforceable and procedural requirements more transparent. Attorneys should take proactive steps to adapt to these changes, including ensuring proper authorization before signing agreements, familiarizing themselves with the updated rules for retaining court jurisdiction, and staying informed about the Judicial Council’s updates to forms and Rules of Court. Additionally, in matters where the court is asked to retain jurisdiction, counsel should contemplate whether to require a dismissal with prejudice to be filed once the settlement obligations have been completed. By doing so, they can effectively represent their clients and navigate the evolving legal landscape with confidence.

The summary judgment process in the California courts is undergoing significant changes as of the beginning of 2025. AB 2049 (effective January 1, 2025) marks the first major changes made to Code of Civil Procedure §437(c) in several decades. The new legislation affects motion timelines, successive motions, and briefing limitations. Though the bill was designed to streamline the litigation process, it is likely to complicate the litigation process for attorneys by front-loading the preparation needed to participate in the summary judgment process.

Longer Notice Periods for Summary Judgment and Adjudication Motions

AB 2049 lengthens the notice period for filing and responding to summary judgment motions. Now, summary judgment motions will need to be filed 81 days in advance of the hearing date, rather than 75. Oppositions are now due 20 days before the hearing date, and reply briefs are due 11 days before the hearing. 

These extended deadlines are designed to give judges more time to evaluate motions after replies are filed. Whether the extra time will result in more summary judgment motions being granted remains to be seen.

Strict Limit on Successive Summary Judgment Motions

Parties are now limited to one summary judgment motion per case, unless the trial court grants them permission to file a second summary judgment motion.  But the process of obtaining leave to file a second motion requires the presentation of the fully prepared motion.  Thus, parties unsuccessful on a summary judgment motion will be required to devote substantial effort and incur substantial expense just to ask to do so. To avoid this burden, attorneys are well advised to delay the bringing of summary judgment motions until later in the litigation process to ensure they present the very best arguments. Unfortunately, due to court congestion and most courts hearing a single summary judgment motion per day, the filing of a summary judgment motion will almost invariably result in a trial continuance. 

Though some courts had previously allowed parties to file multiple motions, it is now universally the rule that a party may only file a second summary judgment if the party is able to obtain the court’s permission. This requirement means that attorneys will need to anticipate opposing arguments and present their entire case initially to maximize their chances of being granted summary judgment in their one crack at it.

While a party is limited to one motion for summary judgment, there are no such limits placed on summary adjudication motions. As such, are we likely to see a proliferation of cases being adjudicated piecemeal through countless adjudication motions? If so, won’t this likely lead to even more paperwork for the parties, burdens on the court, and ultimately delay?

Restrictions on New Evidence in Reply Briefs

New facts and evidence may no longer be introduced in reply briefs under AB 2049. This resolves the inconsistency we’ve seen from court-to-court, with some courts allowing the introduction of new evidence in some situations and other courts never allowing new evidence to be introduced in reply briefs. With these changes, attorneys must be vigilant to include all relevant evidence in their initial motion.

Key Takeaways

The codification of AB 2049 is aimed at making the courts move more efficiently, promoting clarity, and ensuring thoroughness in the briefing process throughout litigation. The extended filing deadlines, limitations on the number of summary judgment motions allowed, and prohibiting the introduction of new evidence in reply briefs may encourage this streamlining of the litigation process. However, it’s also possible that, as attorneys adjust to the new process, there may be new complications that emerge because of what has been left out of the bill.

With limitations on successive motions, attorneys must present all relevant evidence and arguments in their initial filings, anticipating potential counterarguments and evidence from opposing parties. Additionally, cases should be carefully evaluated to determine the best strategy for meeting clients’ needs in each case. Though attorneys can plan for dealing with fewer summary judgments, they may find their workloads drastically increased by an onslaught of summary adjudication motions.

Attorneys should carefully evaluate the strategic implications of the new summary judgment rules on each of their cases and how these new rules will affect their ability to help their clients.